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Abstract
Parental leave and child care are important instruments of family policies to improve work–
family balance. This paper studies the impact of the substantial change in Germany’s parental 
leave system on maternal employment. The aim of the reform was to decrease birth-related 
maternal employment breaks by providing more generous parental benefits for a shorter 
period of time. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel data for 2002–2015, I exploited quasi- 
experimental variation in the benefits to estimate the impact of the reform. I incorporated the 
mother’s decision to substitute her care time with the public child care. To control for the avail-
ability of child care, I used spatial and temporal variation in the availability of childcare slots. 
Overall, I did not find significant changes in maternal employment during the first three years 
of motherhood after the reform implementation. Only for high-income mothers, the reform 
produced a significant decrease in the employment participation during the first year of leave 
and an increase in employment probability after the benefits expired. The empirical findings 
suggest that the restriction in the childcare availability became an important constraint for the 
employment effect of the reform.
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1 Introduction
The relatively low labor participation rate of mothers with young children is a particular char-
acteristic of female labor market. Figure 1 reports the significant differences in employment 
rates of females with and without children in 2012. These differences are significantly large 
for mothers with children aged zero to two years. Germany has one of the lowest participation 
rate for this category (53.8%) among the reported countries. At the same time, the German 
females without children report one of the highest participation rates (8.29%). The comparison 
of these indicators with the values reported in 2006 (Figure 2) reveals the persistence in such 
participation distribution.
The trade-off faced by women with small children1 and working careers — stay at home 
to take care of a child or return back to work — is widely discussed in both the academic liter-
ature and social policy debates. Mothers may base their decision on different factors: e.g., pref-
erences, social norms, income, and time constraints. In general, family policies seek to relieve 
economic constraints and maintain the work–family balance. The concerns surrounding such 
policies are numerous: decreasing fertility rates, demographic burden on the social security 
system, low employment participation rates of mothers, and child welfare, among others. The 
implementation of family policy and its effectiveness can vary significantly across countries 
and institutional contexts.
Parental leave is one of the principal components of government policy supporting the 
reconciliation of family life and careers for women. There is a vast strand of literature analyz-
ing the impact of the parental leave system on mothers’ employment behavior. The empirical 
1 Children younger than 6 years.
Figure 1  Employment rates of females aged 25–54 years by age of the youngest child, 
2012.
Source: Calculations based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) Family Database 2012. Online at: http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
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evidence supports a negative relationship between parental leave benefits and maternal 
employment (Apps and Rees, 2004; Lalive and Zweimuller, 2009; Thevenon and Gauthier, 
2011). If a woman with a young child has the option to stay at home on paid leave, she will use 
it. The longer the job-protected leave and the higher the parental leave payment, the longer 
a woman’s employment break will last. As a consequence, the more difficult it will be to find 
employment afterward.
Another important instrument of family policy is the system of childcare provision. 
This type of governmental support tries to ease mothers’ time constraint by subsidizing 
alternative child care. Childcare policies usually subsidize public childcare institutions or 
compensate the parents’ costs related to child care. Figure 3 shows the positive association 
between maternal employment and children enrollment in public child care across European 
countries in 2012.2 Germany is clearly noted for a low level of childcare provision (17.8%) 
compared to the average (37%).3
Overall, the literature studying childcare policies finds mixed evidence of the effect of 
public childcare expansion on mothers’ employment behavior (Blau and Currie, 2006; Fitzpat-
rick, 2010; Cascio, 2009). At the same time, few studies focus on possible influence of the struc-
ture of the childcare market on the effectiveness of other family policy instruments (Geyer 
et al., 2015; Bick, 2016).
The aim of this paper was to address this gap by evaluating the effect of a paid paren-
tal leave reform on mothers’ employment decisions, given the existing childcare system. In 
2 The childcare systems clearly differ across European countries, depending on the form of provision and funding for it. 
Nevertheless, formal child care, which includes daily operated childcare centers and registered childminders, remains 
the most important source of provision.
3 One may think that informal childcare arrangements can offset the lack of formal institutes. Similar plotting does 
not reflect any correlation between informal care and maternal employment. Since the informal arrangements are an 
important factor, I discuss them in the following sections.
Figure 2  Employment rates of females aged 25–54 years by age of the youngest child, 
2006.
Source: Calculations based on data from the OECD Family Database 2012. Online at: http://
www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
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particular, I analyzed the 2007 German parental leave reform that considerably changed the 
system of family compensation for time that mothers spent out in the labor market. Under the 
prereform system, a mother received a means-tested leave benefit of 300 euros per month that 
was paid out for two years and targeted at lower income families. The reform replaced it with 
the universal payment of 67% of annual prebirth net labor earnings, paid for just one year and 
extending the group of eligible families to the entire population. The unanticipated and quick 
implementation of the new regulation provided a quasi-experimental environment in which to 
evaluate the reform’s impacts on different outcomes.4
The new policy was designed to meet various goals. The payment was intended to counter-
act the decline in families’ earnings in the first year after birth. Reducing the payment period 
from two years to one year was supposed to incentivize the mother’s return to the labor force 
once the payment was terminated. To increase the father’s involvement in caring for the child, 
the new policy provided a “father’s quota” of two paid months if a family decided to share 
childcare responsibilities (14 months of paid leave in total). Overall, the new policy intended to 
make parenthood more attractive to women with careers and to make work more attractive to 
women who had not been in the labor force. The reform turned to increase total parental leave 
benefits for middle- and high-earning women and to decrease it for low-earning women.
Various studies focus on the impact of the 2007 reform on maternal employment. Kluve 
and Tamm (2013) found evidence of a significant decline in mothers’ employment probabil-
ity during the first year of motherhood and an increase of that in the second year, once the 
benefit expires.5 Bergemann and Riphahn (2011) showed the positive effect of the German 
parental leave reform on mothers’ intentions to return to work. They found a positive response 
in maternal labor force participation once the benefit is expired, using semi-parametric Cox 
4 Refer [18] for a detailed review.
5 The author exploits a “natural” experiment using cross-sectional survey data collected by health insurance funds in two 
federal states.
Figure 3  Relationship between maternal employment and child enrollment in formal 
child care, 2012.
Source: Calculations based on data from European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey 2012. Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
income-and-living-conditions/data/database.
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hazard models. Overall, these studies concluded that there is a decrease in maternal employ-
ment during the first year after childbirth and an increase in return to work in the second year 
associated with the reform implementation. Kluve and Schmitz (2018) showed that this pos-
itive effect persists for the medium run (three to five years after childbirth) for medium- and 
high-earning mothers. The important drawback of these studies is that they do not consider 
the availability of child care.
Geyer et al. (2015) found a decline in maternal labor supply during the first year and 
an increase in that in the second year. Using a structural labor supply model, they examined 
the role of subsidized child care. The simulated results show that significantly larger maternal 
employment effects might be observed once universal child care is available.
A number of studies discussed childcare provision in Germany and its role in maternal 
employment. Muehler (2010) compared public sector and non-public providers. She empha-
sized the lack of full-day slots for children under three years of age and a significant regional 
variation in access. Using microsimulations, Haan and Wrohlich (2011) concluded that child-
care subsidies conditional on maternal employment status increase the labor supply. Bick 
(2016) counterfactual policy analysis showed that insufficient subsidies for childcare provi-
sion decrease labor participation by mothers with children younger than three years. Schober 
(2012) focused on the allocation of childcare time between parents and found that the 2007 
parental leave reform increased fathers’ involvement in child care.
Following the literature, I studied on the relationship between maternal employment and 
childcare decisions in each of first three years of motherhood. The reform sought to support 
families with a newborn through increased parental benefits and to decrease birth-related 
employment breaks through a shortened paid-leave period. Given that maternal employment 
is conditional on access to child care, I focused on the reform’s effect on mother’s employment 
decision in the context of restricted childcare alternatives. To identify the effect of the reform, 
I exploited temporal variation in parental leave benefits and temporal and spatial variations in 
childcare provision. Using German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data for 2002–2015, I esti-
mated a bivariate choice model of maternal employment and childcare decisions in two spec-
ifications with and without controlling for a mother’s childcare choice. Without controlling 
for childcare decision, the findings suggested the positive impact of the reform on the employ-
ment after childbirth. These results are in line with the previous findings of Kluve and Tamm 
(2013), Bergemann and Riphahn (2011), and Geyer et al. (2015). Once the estimations are cor-
rected to the childcare factor, the policy effects turn insignificant. Only the mothers in full-
time employment report the increase in participation associated with policy (6.4% points). The 
effect is driven by high-income mothers. Estimating the possibility of childcare arrangements 
and labor force participation jointly, the analysis provides new evidence on the importance 
of institutional constraints for policy implementation. I contribute to the literature showing 
that the estimation of previous studies is likely to be biased since the childcare decision is not 
considered. My empirical evidence confirms the importance of childcare availability for the 
mothers’ labor market participation. The enrollment in public childcare increases significantly 
labor force participation. At the same time, I observed that higher availability of public child-
care implies higher probability of its usage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the institutional characteris-
tics of parental leave reform and the childcare system in Germany. Section 3 discusses the 
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identification strategy and presents the German data used for the analysis. Section 4 describes 
the main findings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Family policy in Germany
For a long time, Germany has implemented a complex family policy targeted at maternal 
protection and child-rearing. A family with a newborn is entitled to maternity leave benefits, 
parental leave benefits, child benefits, a child tax allowance, and additional household benefits 
based on the number of children. The benefits are almost universal in Germany. The eligibility 
criterion is the parent’s German or European citizenship and a settlement permit or a residence 
permit with at least three years’ past employment in Germany.
The maternity leave system consists of a period of 14 paid weeks, typically divided into six 
weeks before childbirth and eight weeks afterward. During maternity leave, mothers are not 
allowed to work but are insured against dismissal. They also receive maternity benefits (Mut-
terschaftsgeld) – a net government transfer of up to 13 euros per day and additional coverage 
equal to the net income if the woman is eligible for social insurance. Employed women without 
government insurance receive a one-time maternity allowance of up to 210 euros6 and supple-
ments from the employer.
The parents receive an untaxed allowance (Kindergeld) until the child’s 18th birthday. 
For the first and second child, this consists of 184 euros, with a slight increase to 190 euros 
for a third child and to 214 euros for each child thereafter. The parents can deduct part of 
the income necessary to maintain a child from their tax return. Low-income households7 can 
further apply for an in-work tax credit (Kinderzuschlag) of up to 140 euros per month for six 
months. Parents may also be eligible for the accommodation allowance (Wohngeld) in the 
form of home-ownership subsidies for low-income families with a higher number of children.
The German paid-leave system was established in the mid-1950s when mothers have been 
entitled to job-protected paid leave 6 weeks before childbirth and 8 weeks after childbirth.8 In 
1979, the duration was raised to six months, but the payment remained unchanged. In 1986, 
the duration of the job protection and payment leave was increased to ten months. In addi-
tion, fathers became eligible for parental leave. Further reforms in the beginning of the 1990s 
increased the job-protected period to 36 months (1992) and the duration of leave payment to 
24 months (1993). These reforms defined the structure of the parental leave system for almost 
15 years, before a new set of family policies came into force.9
Under this original system, a parent could share job-protected parental leave of up to 
three years (Elternzeit). During parental leave, the parent who stayed at home (or worked fewer 
than 30 hours per week10) received the child-rearing benefit (Erziehungsgeld). It was a uni-
versal means-tested transfer with an income cap (30,000 euros for the first six months and 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/missoc/db/public/compareTables.do?lang=en.
7 Income up to 900 euros per couple or 600 euros per single parent.
8 The following description of changes in the paid leave system is based on Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014).
9 During this period, the parental leave system saw some minor modifications. For instance, since 2001, parents with a 
part-time contract have been entitled to benefits.
10 It is equivalent to reduced full-time work in Germany.
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16,500 euros afterward for a married couple11). The eligible period was up to 24 months, and 
the payment was 300 euros per month.12 If the income threshold was exceeded, the benefit was 
withdrawn at a rate of 63%. Thus, the child-rearing benefit depended on the gross income of 
the household and the mother’s labor participation decision. Under the old policy, the parental 
leave payment was targeted to low-income families, as the income threshold and the amount 
made the payment negligible for middle- and high-income households.13
Even though fathers became eligible for parental leave in 1986, the male take-up ratio of 
the leave was insignificant. Parental leave was effectively maternal leave, and child-rearing was 
considered a traditional maternal activity within the “bread-winner” household model. Ger-
man mothers delayed their return to work, and the availability to take longer leave weakened 
their labor force attachments (Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014; Geyer and Steiner, 2007; Ondrich 
et al., 2003).
2.2 The 2007 parental leave reform
Negative trends in reproduction and the low labor market participation rate of mothers with 
children younger than three years14 led to further reforms to the parental leave system.
The new parental leave system was established at the end of 2006 and took effect for chil-
dren born after January 1, 2007. The main changes in the reform were financial. Under the new 
system, the means-tested child-rearing benefit (Erziehungsgeld) has been replaced by the paren-
tal allowance (Elterngeld), which accounts for 67% of the rearing parent’s net labor income per 
month. The benefit is calculated on the basis of the average labor earnings 12 months prior to 
the birth. If a parent caring for a child was economically inactive prior to the child’s birth, she 
(he) receives a flat minimum of 300 euros per month (3,600 euros per year). This minimum is 
also paid to those whose parents’ benefits would otherwise be less than 300 euros (part-time 
employees, those with a mini job, low earners). The benefit is truncated at 1,800 euros per 
month (21,600 euros per year), meaning that a parent with prebirth monthly net labor earn-
ings more than 2,700 euros can get only the maximum payment. The benefit replacement rate 
increases to 100% if the child-rearing parent’s net income is less than 1,000 euros per month.
Another important change in the parental leave legislation is the cutoff in the dura-
tion of payment. Parental leave payments are granted for 14 months if both parents share the 
child-rearing and for 12 months in a single-carer household. The condition to work no more 
than 30 hours a week remains unchanged, but the reduction in the amount and duration of 
benefits makes part-time employment less attractive. In 2010, approximately 2%–9% of moth-
ers were employed part-time while receiving benefits.
The reform was designed with various goals in mind. First, it aims to provide substan-
tial financial support to families with children younger than one year, targeting middle- and 
high-income households.15 Second, it encourages mothers to return to work after childbirth. 
11 These thresholds were applied from 2004 onward, and they had previously stood at 51,130 euros per year per married 
couple. They were different for single parents and varied with the number of children in the household.
12 The parents could choose a payment of 450 euros per monthly for up to 12 months. This option was chosen by 
approximately 13% parents.
13 The income cap allowed about 77% of all parents to claim the benefits during the first six months after childbirth. 
Afterward, only 50% of families were entitled to the benefit.
14 For instance, 48% in Germany compared to 77% in Sweden (OECD 2006).
15 Huebener et al. (2016) provided a detailed discussion of the critics of the political shift in the distribution targets.
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Third, it addresses gender equality by enhancing the father’s involvement in child care. Ini-
tially, an increased birthrate among working women was not named as an official goal of the 
reform, but it was added later (Huebener et al., 2016).
As Spiess and Wrohlich (2008) point out, the main idea of the 2007 reforms was to move 
the design of the existing parental system toward the Scandinavian model, in which family 
policy supports the “dual-earner household.” There was a belief among German politicians 
that the Scandinavian model, with its high supply of publicly funded daycare and its generous 
parental leave system, promotes higher employment rates among mothers with young chil-
dren, as well as higher fertility rates due to policies that reduced family income losses after 
childbirth.
According to administrative statistics, the take-up ratio was about 96% of all mothers 
between 2007 and 2010, with the average duration of parental leave almost a full period of 
12 months. The average amount of benefits was also increasing. Comparing the simulated pre- 
and postreform benefits, Raute (2019) showed that the financial gain in benefits was continu-
ously increasing in the postreform period.
The administrative data also report a significant increase in the take-up ratio of paren-
tal leave by fathers. In the first year after the reform, the share jumped from 2.5% to 15%. It 
increased continuously and was more than 34% in 2014. However, Kluve and Tamm (2013) 
showed that the higher participation in parental leave did not translate into significant involve-
ment of the father in child-rearing. Most of the fathers received the benefit during the two 
months that could be added to the mother’s 12 months and then returned to work.
2.3 Childcare provision
The German childcare system represents a universal mixed-market provision by public institu-
tions and different types of non-state providers, such as religious institutions, private nonprofit 
organizations, commercial daycare centers, nannies, childminders, and family daycare. While 
public centers are under municipality or local-authority control, private nonprofit providers 
belong to welfare organizations. Centers run by churches are part of the public market. The 
owners of commercial centers are entrepreneurs or companies providing childcare services for 
employees. According to the survey “Children and Personnel in Child-Care Centres”,16 public 
centers had 34% of total market share in 2009. The religious centers run by churches covered 
36% of the market, while the nonprofit centers operated by nonpublic institutions represented 
28% of the market share. The proportion of commercial centers was significantly low – only 
approximately 2%. Apart from the institutes run by public authorities, all the other categories 
were eligible for public finance. Therefore, the German childcare market can be defined as 
highly state dependent.
The German childcare market is characterized by price rationing. The local communities 
that finance and run the majority of public childcare institutions set their fees based on house-
hold income and the child’s age.17 Borck and Wrohlich (2011) reported the following numbers 
for children younger than three years: in 2005, the parents’ monthly fees, on average, were 
16 The data are a part of the annual “Child and Youth Welfare Survey” collected by the German Federal Statistical Office.
17 The privately subsidized institutions use a similar scheme.
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100 euros for a part-time slot and 120 euros for a full-time slot, while public expenditures were 
approximately 700 euros per month per child.
Since public childcare is relatively cheap, there is a high demand for slots. It is accom-
panied by low availability and high heterogeneity across Eastern and Western Germany, in 
particular for children younger than three years. Haan and Wrohlich (2011) showed that public 
childcare slots were available to only 8% of this age category in Western Germany in 2006 but 
to 40% of this age category in Eastern Germany.18 Muehler (2010) showed that the largest part 
of the Western German market is served by non-profit organizations, while municipal pub-
lic institutions are more typical in the eastern part of the country. Additional heterogeneity 
comes from the distribution of childcare providers at the regional level. Therefore, the supply 
of childcare might exhibit systematic differences by region or by parental preferences regarding 
the type of childcare provider. Muehler (2010) results confirm that non-profit and commercial 
centers provide a substantially higher share of full-time child care for children younger than 
three years than public providers offer, even when controlling for the regional factor and pro-
vider distribution.
In recent years, Germany has put substantial effort into increasing public childcare provi-
sion. The 2005 federal law regarding day-care expansion (Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz) estab-
lished extra funding for additional childcare slots in public facilities. In particular, it focused 
on two groups: children younger than one year and younger than two to three years. The 2008 
federal law (Kinderförderungsgesetz) continued enhancing the states’ investment in childcare 
infrastructure. The principal goal was to achieve coverage of 35% of all children younger than 
three years by 2013. It also guaranteed the parents’ legal right to the daycare slot for children 
aged one year and older from August 2013, unconditional on parents’ employment status or 
income. All of these efforts resulted in an increase in the average attendance rate for children 
younger than three years, from 13.6% in 2006 to 32.7% in 2016. Table 1 reports the dynamics 
of childcare coverage in terms of the percentage of all children younger than three years who 
attend childcare at the state level. We can see that the demand for slots is higher than the supply 
for all states (see Table 219).
2.4  Mechanism: the effect of the reform on the labor participation  
decision
Under the new parental leave system, mothers might respond differently to the introduced 
financial incentives, depending on the child’s age and the income status of the household. 
Kluve and Tamm (2013) distinguished between two groups in the population of mothers enti-
tled to the new benefits. The first group consisted of low-income mothers who were entitled 
to benefits under both the old and the new regimes. For them, the policy reduced the overall 
income related to the leave payments (the same payment over a 12-month shorter period). We 
might expect that after the termination of payments, mothers would return to work to adjust to 
the income loss during the next 12 months.
18 Eastern Germany inherited the childcare system from the former German Democratic Republic, where family policy 
stimulated maternal employment.
19 The administrative data on childcare demand are available from 2006 onward and for childcare supply are available 
only from 2012.
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The second group consisted of mothers who did not receive any benefit under the old 
system. Now, they are entitled to a payment that partially covers the household’s income loss 
related to maternity. We might expect a drop in mothers’ employment rate during the child’s 
Table 1  Public childcare enrollment rates for children younger than three years,  
2006–2015
Region 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Baden-Württemberg 8.7 11.5 13.6 15.8 18.3 20.8 23.1 24.9  27.8  27.8
Bayern 8.2 10.7 13.2 15.7 18.5 20.6 23.0 24.8  27.1  27.5
Berlin 37.8 39.8 40.4 41.5 42.1 41.9 42.6 43.7  46.0  45.9
Brandenburg 40.4 43.4 44.8 48.3 51.0 51.6 53.4 53.6 57.8 56.8
Bremen 9.2 10.5 12.7 13.7 16.1 19.6 21.2 23.2 26.9 27.1
Hamburg 21.0 22.0 20.1 22.2 28.5 32.4 35.8 38.4 43.0 43.3
Hessen 9.0 12.4 14.2 16.3 19.3 21.5 23.7 25.7 28.8 29.7
Mecklenburg- 
Vorpommern
43.1 44.1 44.9 49.5 50.7 51.7 53.6 54.5 56.1 56.0
Niedersachsen 5.1 6.9 9.1 11.9 15.8 18.6 22.1 24.4 27.9 28.3
Nordrhein-Westfalen 6.5 6.9 9.3 11.5 14.0 15.9 18.1 19.9 23.8 25.8
Rheinland-Pfalz 9.4 12.0 15.0 17.5 20.1 24.7 27.0 28.2 30.6 30.6
Saarland 10.2 12.1 14.1 15.1 17.7 20.2 22.1 24.6 27.0 28.3
Sachsen 33.5 34.6 36.5  40.1 42.8 44.1 46.4 47.2 49.9 50.6
Sachsen-Anhalt 50.2 51.8 52.7 55.1 55.9 56.1 57.5 57.7 58.3 57.9
Schleswig-Holstein 7.5 8.2 11.6 14.3 18.1 21.6 24.2 26.3 30.3 31.4
Thüringen 37.9 37.5 38.9 42.8 45.1 46.9 49.8 51.4 52.4 52.3
Germany 13.6 15.5 17.6 20.2 23.0 25.5 27.6 29.3 32.3 32.9
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
Table 2  Excess of demand to public childcare for children younger than three years,  
2012–2015
Region 2012 2013 2014 2015
Baden-Württemberg 13.7 13.9 11.4 11.0
Bayern 8.6 11.0 8.3 9.2
Berlin 13.3 9.4 7.5 7.6
Brandenburg 4.1 7.7 4.1 4.5
Bremen 19.5 16.6 11.0 14.1
Hamburg 9.4 9.2 7.4 8.5
Hessen 14.2 16.1 10.6 10.0
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 6.8 6.6 5.2 6.5
Niedersachsen 13.2 13.0 10.4 11.3
Nordrhein-Westfalen 15.8 15.2 9.6 13.3
Rheinland-Pfalz 13.1 14.4 12.5 11.8
Saarland 12.9 14.3 10.1 11.1
Sachsen 6.1 7.9 4.8 6.1
Sachsen-Anhalt 3.3 4.8 4.5 4.3
Schleswig-Holstein 10.6 13.0 13.5 12.2
Thüringen 3.8 4.3 4.8 4.3
Germany 11.8 12.4 9.2 10.2
Source: German Federal Statistical Office.
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first year. Once the payments expire, the effect becomes ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
standard labor supply model (see Klerman and Leibowitz, 1999) predicts a positive impact 
of the policy on female labor force participation. An increase in the amount of benefits and a 
shorter payment period generate a sizable income decrease, thus creating a strong incentive to 
maintain the household income level by returning to work (income effect). On the other hand, 
before the reform, these mothers did not get anything; now, though, the payment may allow 
smoothing of consumption and an increasing in the reservation wage, thus postponing moth-
ers’ return to work (wealth effect). Overall, the effect of the reform might be ambiguous during 
the second year after childbirth.
The reform did not introduce any changes in benefit entitlements in the last year of 
job-protected parental leave. Thus, the possible adjustment in employment behavior that we 
might observe during third or fourth years is related to decisions made in the first two years 
after childbirth.
The mechanism discussed earlier relies on the assumption that a mother can return to 
work immediately after making her decision. In practice, she needs to find a substitute for 
her childcare time. Nonparental child care may include different options, from paid daycare 
centers to unpaid care by relatives, but it should be available and affordable for a family at the 
moment of decision-making. Following Laroque and Salanié (2014), I consider a mother who 
maximizes her utility function in consumption (working hours and purchasing child care) and 
leisure (implicitly includes the option of taking care of the child herself), subject to budget and 
time constraints. The availability of subsidized child care loosens up the budget constraint. 
Depending on her preferences and whether a substitution effect dominates an income effect, 
a mother might respond by having a higher demand for subsidized child care and an increase 
in her employment. Then, the restricted supply of public child care and the shortage of other 
alternatives (private market or informal childcare) could make the maternal labor supply too 
expensive for the household.
Another consideration is related to the hours during which child care is available. In Ger-
many, the public childcare slots exist in the following modes: part-time (less than 25 hours 
per week), extended part-time (between 25 and 35 hours per week), and full-time (more than 
35 hours per week). Only a half of all enrolled children in 2012 were in full-time slots; 21% 
were in part-time slots and 27% were in extended part-time slots (BMFSFJ, 2017). Therefore, a 
mother can face difficulties in adapting her work schedule to the childcare facility’s hours of 
operation. The cultural context also matters. In a society in which child-rearing is traditionally 
considered a maternal activity, the financial incentives for mothers to return to work earlier do 
not necessarily translate into higher employment.
Summing up, the effect of the parental leave policy on maternal employment might be 
ambiguous for different reasons. Whether there is a positive shift in maternal employment 
depends not only on a mother’s preferences but also on the constraints she faces in finding a 
substitute for her childcare time. The existence of considerable excess demand for subsidized 
child care is a potential constraint to the reform implementation. Since the private childcare 
sector is particularly expensive and cannot be regarded as an alternative to the public sector, 
women face an important constraint when making the decision regarding their labor partici-
pation.
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3 Data and empirical strategy
3.5 Data and descriptive evidence
The empirical analysis is based on data from the GSOEP, a longitudinal household survey that 
collects information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics from a representa-
tive sample of German private households.20 The survey currently covers approximately 19,000 
households, 25,000 adult respondents, and 6,000 children living in the surveyed households.
To analyze the effects of the parental leave reform on childcare and return-to-work behav-
ior, I used the survey’s detailed information on the childcare time allocation of mothers with 
newborns. The data allowed me to identify the usage of child care from public institutions, 
private institutions, and/or relatives. In addition, since 2003, the survey has been collecting 
detailed information on the various characteristics of newborn offspring (2002 and subsequent 
birth years) using the “Mother and Child” questionnaire, which covers such issues as time of 
pregnancy, initial motherhood evaluation, health and child care of newborns, and the support 
given by a partner.
I constructed the dataset using waves for 2001–2015.21 The sample consisted of 1,748 
women between the ages of 20 and 46 years who gave birth within the considered period of 
2002–2011. I excluded women who gave birth during December 2006 and January 2007 since 
Neugart and Ohlsson (2013) found empirical evidence of birth shifting toward January 2007, 
when the new parental leave system came into force. The observational unit was the birth of a 
child.22 The sample was balanced, 50.46% of the births happened before the policy implemen-
tation.
The objective of the analysis was to estimate whether the reform had a positive impact on 
labor participation during the first years of motherhood controlling for childcare decisions. I 
followed each mother up to 48 months after giving birth and considered her labor force partic-
ipation and childcare decisions during the first three years of job-protected parental leave and 
the fourth year, when the parental leave right expires.
Monthly information on employment, periods of maternity leave, and a child’s birth date 
allowed me to define when a woman returns to work. I considered only the first transition into 
employment. To compare the reform effects for different margins of labor supply, I considered 
various outcomes for each year of motherhood:
• Employment: empit is an overall indicator for mothers’ regular labor participation at the 
extensive margin. It is a dummy variable where empit = 1, if mother i reports regular 
employment at year t of motherhood, and empit = 0 otherwise.
• Full-time employment: empfit defines the group of mothers working full-time; empfit = 1 
if mother i reports working full-time at year t of motherhood and empfit = 0 otherwise.
• Part-time employment: emppit defines the group of mothers working part-time;
23 emppit = 1 
if mother i reports working part-time at year t of motherhood and emppit = 0 otherwise.
20 For more detailed information, see Wagner et al. (2007).
21 Since the ultimate reform related to family policy took place in 2000, I assumed that the only expected impact on 
mothers’ employment decisions comes from the changes in 2007.
22 Twins are treated as a single unit.
23 The mother works no more than 35 hours per week.
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To determine whether a mother is the main childcare provider, I used the GSOEP infor-
mation on the type of childcare used. The questionnaire allowed me to identify whether a 
family uses a public childcare slot and whether the time that the child spends in a childcare 
institution is sufficient for a woman to work full-time or part-time. In addition, I checked 
whether a family uses the help of a paid childminder controlling for the number of hours. The 
final variable ccit is a dummy variable where ccit = 1, if the formal number of hours a child of 
mother i at year t spends at paid child care, provided by both public and private institutions, is 
sufficient for mothers’ employment.
The survey also provides information about additional help from the mother’s partner, 
parents, and other relatives or friends, but the data on how many hours people other than the 
mother look after the child are restricted. I created an informal childcare variable equal to 1 if 
a woman gets any help from her partner, grandparents, relatives, and friends.
To account for the childcare availability constraint discussed earlier, I constructed a 
variable that measures the provision of childcare for children younger than three years at the 
regional level. The childcare coverage rate ccrjt is defined as the percentage of children of this 
age in formal child care region i in year t.24
I considered different time windows around the reform implementation: 2006–2007, 
2005–2008, and 2002–2011. Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables and sample peri-
ods are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 reports the descriptive evidence of differences in women’s labor participation 
and childcare decisions before and after the reform implementation for various time windows 
around the reform. We do not observe any differences in mothers’ labor force participation for 
the samples 2006–2007 and 2005–2008. The share of employed women during the second year 
of motherhood significantly increased in the postreform period only for the sample 2002–2011, 
with the differences driven by the group of mothers working full-time or part-time. These 
changes are accompanied by an increase in use of formal child care.
The general set of individual control variables includes the mother’s age, education, part-
nership status, employment status, and individual labor income prior to giving birth. If a part-
ner lives in the household, I included his personal characteristics and income. An eligibility 
indicator dit allocated mother t into the treated group if she had a child in year t after 2007.
The main summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 4 for the various pre- 
and postreform samples. The employment status and labor income variables are measured at 
the last employment spell prior to the birth. The income variables are adjusted to the 2005 base 
using regional consumer price indexes.
The samples observed shortly before and after reform implementation in 2006 and 2007 
do not report any significant differences in females’ characteristics. The prereform mothers, 
who gave birth during two years prior to the reform, are less educated, are more likely to give 
a birth to the first child, and are more likely to be fully employed. These differences preserve 
for five-year time window around the reform. Table 4 shows two further important differ-
ences in the socioeconomic characteristics of females who gave birth in the period 2002–
2011. The postreform mothers, on average, are less likely to be married, participate actively 
24 The calculations are based on the German administrative child care (“Statistik der Kinder- und Jugendhilfe”) and 
population (“BevĂ¶lkerungsstand: BevĂ¶lkerungnachGeschlecht und Altersgruppen”) data for 2006–2015. Information 
on childcare coverage before 2006 is not available. I used the 2006 values as a reference for the period 2002–2005 since 
the childcare provision had not passed through any reforms in these dates.
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in the labor market in full-time jobs, and have higher labor income. At the same time, the 
households do not report significant differences in household incomes. Other characteristics 
remain similar.
Following Laroque and Salanié (2014), the identification relies on the variation in finan-
cial incentives induced by the parental leave reform, the variation in the partner’s labor income, 
and the regional variation in access to a public childcare slot. The GSOEP provides informa-
tion on the parental leave benefits received. First, an individual reports the average monthly 
amount of paid benefits; second, based on the observed socioeconomic characteristics of an 
individual and a household, the variable of the yearly paid maternal allowance is generated. 
According to the descriptive statistics for the estimation sample 2002–2011, the parental ben-
efits significantly increased by, on average, 1,600 euros per year (almost 400 euros per month) 
after the implementation of the reform (see Table 4). Figure 4 shows the distribution of the 
reported benefits for the pre- and postreform periods. As expected, for all wage categories, the 
expected payment shifted to the right. In addition, there is a substantial variation in the intro-
duced benefits for eligible mothers.
Descriptive statistics on childcare coverage show significant variation for the treated 
and control groups. These differences capture the variation in child care between states in the 
cross-section and over time discussed in Section 2.
3.6 Empirical strategy
Following Del Boca and Daniela (2007), I considered a household that derives utility from 
household net income Yit, leisure time lit , and child care CCit . To avoid the problem of house-
hold bargaining, I assumed that in each time period, a woman optimally decides about her 
employment Lit and child care CCit behavior, i.e., she maximizes the household utility condi-
tioning on her partner’s behavior.25
 U = u(cc, l)
The goods are assumed to be normal.
As a result of the utility maximization problem, we observe the following maternal 
outcomes:
• the mother i’s employment outcome empit at time t (binary variable is equal to 1 if she 
decides to work at a regular job) and
• the mother i’s childcare outcome ccit at time t (binary variable is equal to 1 if she decides 
to use formal child care).
The return-to-work decision is correlated with the decision about child care. On the one hand, 
a mother needs to substitute for her time in order to work. On the other hand, if she prefers 
to remain the main childcare provider, she does not return to her job. Therefore, I considered 
these decisions simultaneously. Summing up, at time t for a household i, the female choice set 
is represented by the following empit × ccit combinations:
25 Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) showed the insignificance of the cross-elasticities among the partners.
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• (0,0): the mother does not work, staying in the household as the principal childcare provider;
• (1,1): the mother works, and she engages formal child care;
• (0,1): the mother stays at home and takes care of the child, but with additional help from 
formal child care; and
• (1,0): the mother combines work and child care using informal help.
Notice that the net household income varies with the set of possible outcomes.
To evaluate the policy effect and to account for the potential correlation between employ-
ment and childcare decisions, I estimated the bivariate model. I used the existing variation in 
Figure 4  Maternity benefits in pre- and postreformed period.
Source: Calculations based on data from GSOEP survey v34.
Page 18 of 27   Chirkova. IZA Journal of Labor Policy (2019) 9:7
childcare provision at the state level to model the decision of formal childcare usage. Then, I 
exploited the quasi-random variation in financial benefits at the individual level to identify 
the effect of the reform on the employment decision given the mother’s childcare decision. The 
empirical specification of the model is as follows:
 











∑β β ν β β( ) = + + + +
=
P cc cco ccinf X uijt jt ijt ijt ijt
l
k
0 1 2 1 2 2
3
. (2)
where P(empijt) is the employment probability for the mother i at period t in the state j, di is a 
policy indicator for the postreform period starting in January 2007, and emplbefij is an employ-
ment status indicator for the mother i prior to her pregnancy. The variable P(ccijt) represents the 
probability of formal child care usage for the same mother. cccovjt is the childcare enrollment 
ratio in region j in period t, ccinfit is an indicator variable for the actual use of informal child 
care, and X1ijt and X2ijt are vectors of various individual and household sociodemographic char-
acteristics.
The general set of individual control variables for the mother includes age, education, 
marital status, her partners’ characteristics, and household income. I assumed that characteris-
tics such as public childcare availability, use of informal child care, number of children, child’s 
gender, and whether the child is a firstborn have a direct impact on the childcare decision, but 
not on the labor participation decision.
Notice that the subscript t : t = {1,2,3} refers to the years of parental leave after childbirth. 
For instance, t = 1 refers to the decisions made during the first year of child leave. Since I focus 
on the first transition into employment, the probability of being employed in the subsequent 
period is conditional on the previous nonparticipation decision.
The model (2) allows correlation between employment and childcare decisions 
through two channels. First, there is a direct effect of the childcare decision on the partic-
ipation decision (as measured by the parameter a4 from equation (1)). Second, the model 
allows correlation between individual-specific time-invariant effects, corr(u1ijt, u2ijt) ≠ 0. 
To test the significance of the childcare decision variable, I considered two specifications 
of equation (1) with and without ccijt. I estimated the system (1, 2) using the bivariate 
probit model.
The parameters of interests are as follows:
• a1 that measures the impact of the reform on mothers’ employment participation at 
extensive margin and
• a3 that measures changes in labor supply of females who worked prior to a childbirth. 
Given the reform’s design, one might expect heterogeneous response with female employ-
ment status prior to birth.
To evaluate the effect of the 2007 reform on mothers’ return to labor force, I used a quasi- 
experimental environment generated by the unanticipated changes in the parental leave system. 
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The treatment group consisted of the mothers who were entitled to the benefit after the reform 
implementation – i.e., women with children born on or after January 1, 2007.26 The control 
group consisted of mothers who gave the birth before the reform was implemented.
The estimation of the causal effect of the reform has various issues. Since the treatment 
is universal, every mother is eligible for benefits. Therefore, we could not observe any con-
trol group outcome after the reform implementation. Thus, the empirical strategy consists of 
a before–after comparison of mothers from the control group, who gave birth shortly before a 
reform, and mothers from the treatment group, who gave birth shortly after the reform.27
The key identification assumption was that, without implementation of the reform, moth-
ers in both groups would have behaved similarly in their employment decision after child-
birth. This assumption required that the reform did not influence the fertility patterns in either 
groups. The empirical studies based on German Microcensus data present mixed evidence on 
the reform’s impact on the fertility patterns in the short and middle run. Cygan-Rehm (2016) 
found that the reform had a negative effect on the fertility decisions of low-income mothers 
through birth postponement. She also documented weak positive effects for other income 
groups. Raute (2019) pointed to a jump in fertility rates in August 2007. She also found an 
increase in fertility rates only for highly educated women over the five-year postreform period.
Kluve and Tamm (2013) showed that the reform was not anticipated by families. They 
presented a detailed analysis of the legislative process and news coverage, pointing out that 
the reform took place quite quickly. The government coalition agreed on the reform in May 
2006, and the law was passed in the parliament four months later, in September 2006.28 Then, 
one might expect that there was no self-selection in treatment for parents who conceived child 
before October 2006 (children born before June 2007).
Another potential threat to the validity of identification was the 2007–2009 financial cri-
sis that could have had consequences for the employment and fertility behavior of the popu-
lation. The empirical evidence suggests that the German economy, unlike the economies of 
other European countries, did not suffer long-term consequences of the crisis. On the contrary, 
Weber and Weber (2013) reported a decrease in unemployment rates during the period 2006–
2011. Raute (2019) found no shift in fertility behavior due to the economic crisis.
The parental leave reform coincided with the expansion of child care – a combination of 
policies that could have affected maternal employment behavior. By construction, however, 
the two reforms seem not to be systematically related.29 The parental leave system is regulated 
and financed by the federal government, while the expansion of subsidized child care is sup-
ported partially by the federal government and partially by the states. The number of available 
childcare slots and infrastructural investments vary significantly by the state. Table 1 reports 
the childcare coverage in terms of the percentage of all children younger than three years who 
attended child care at the state level. Overall, the average attendance rate for children younger 
than three years increased from 13.6% in 2006 to 32.9% in 2015. We can see in Table 5 that 
26 I focused on mothers’ labor force participation decisions since that was one of the key goals of the reform (see Section 
(2)). In addition, the “father’s quota” did not increase the fathers’ involvement in child care and significantly changed 
fathers’ employment pattern (Kluve and Tamm. 2013)
27 A similar identification strategy has been used widely in the literature. In this context, see Schönberg and Ludsteck 
(2014), Kluve and Tamm (2013), and Geyer et al. (2015).
28 See, also, Kluve and Schmitz (2018).
29 See the discussion of childcare reform in Section 2.
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the demand for slots was higher than the supply for all states during the observation period.30 
All regions report an upward time trend in number of open slots, and no significant jump is 
observed around the reform implementation in 2007. This implies that the trends in childcare 
demand–supply over time were the same for both control and treated groups.
4 Estimation results
All estimations of this section are based on the main sample that includes mothers with chil-
dren aged zero to three years born from 2002 to 2011. Table 5 presents average marginal effects 
for maternal employment computed using the bivariate probit model (1, 2) estimation. The 
estimated model controls for a set of individual and household characteristics. The specifica-
tion includes the mother’s age, education, marital status, prior-to-birth labor income, current 
household income, received amount of parental leave benefits, and partner’s characteristics. I 
also controlled for the dwelling location: Eastern or Western Germany. In addition, I included 
an indicator variable for a woman who gave birth to her first child, gender of the child, and 
the number of children in the childcare equation. I also controlled for the available help for a 
newborn from a partner and relatives, including the informal childcare variable.
Table 5 is structured as follows. Estimates are reported in three groups of rows, one each 
for a year of motherhood. I considered three participation decisions of mothers: to work, to 
work full-time, and to work part-time. For each of these three groups, I reported average mar-
ginal effects of the reform with and without childcare decision control.
For the first year of motherhood, the data do not report significant changes in moth-
ers’ job participation decisions. Notice that the sign of the coefficient is negative, which sup-
ports the hypothesis that labor force participation drops during the first year of motherhood. 
These results confirm the same pattern identified in the previous research: once we control for 
covariates, the probability of return to work remains unchanged or drops insignificantly. The 
childcare decision does not influence the employment decision. The partial explanation might 
be related to the fact that the number of childcare facilities for a child younger than one year 
is more limited comparing to the slots for children aged one to three years. Being employed 
before birth increased the marginal probability of return to work by almost 10% point both for 
pre- and postreform mothers. It does not vary after policy implementation and remains both 
in full-time and part-time participation groups.
For the second year of motherhood, when the parental leave payments stop, a positive 
significant shift in the employment probability by 20% points is observed. However, the effect 
of the introduced incentives becomes insignificant after controlling for the childcare decision. 
It implies that the estimate of the policy impact is biased upward and captures partially the 
possibility of the mother to use a formal childcare. The results also suggest that the mothers 
who use formal child care increase their marginal probability to return to work by 40% points 
comparing to the mothers without access to public child care.
The policy effect remains statistically significant only for the group of mothers who work 
full-time. The marginal probability to get full employment is 6.4% points higher for postreform 
mothers compared to those from the prereform group. Interestingly, this specification reveals 
30 The administrative data for the actual enrollment are available from 2006 and onward, and the data for the slots offered 
are available only from 2012.
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that the effect is not driven by the mothers who were employed before the childbirth. The access 
to public child care remains an important factor in participation decision, but the impact value 
drops significantly. These results partially confirm the empirical findings of previous childcare 
studies for Germany. For example, Müller and Wrohlich (2018) found that an increase in child-
care slots by 1% point increases mothers’ participation by 0.2% points. At the same time, I did 
not find significant positive policy effects on the labor force participation during the second 
year, which is in line with Kluve and Tamm (2013), but contradicts the results of Geyer et al. 
(2015). Interestingly, the positive significant effect of the reform on the mothers with full-time 
employment is not reported before.
The last year of job-protected parental leave is unpaid for both pre- and postreform 
groups. The interaction of policy variables with employment status prior to birth still remains 
insignificant, and the overall policy indicator reports an insignificant negative impact. The 
impact of other variables discussed earlier remains significant. The possibility of formal child 
care remains an important factor on the mother’s employment decision, and the employment 
before childbirth increases the probability to work afterward.
Table 6 reports strongly significantly very robust positive associations between childcare 
coverage rates and the probability to use formal child care. The decision to use formal child 
care depends positively on the access to public childcare institutions and negatively on the 
possibility of using a partner and relatives as childcare substitutes. A higher current household 
labor income has a positive association with the childcare decision.
Summing up the preliminary analysis of the 2007 parental leave reform shows a pos-
itive association of the policy shift with the labor force participation decision. However, 
after controlling for childcare decision, the effect remains only for the mothers working 
full-time during the second year of the motherhood. These findings suggest that if we con-
sider labor force participation and childcare decisions jointly, controlling for a mother’s 
possibility of finding a substitute for her child care, the 2007 reform does not seem to pro-
duce a significant impact on employment behavior during the job-protected parental leave 
period.
The reform design suggests that the new financial scheme of parental leave payment might 
give low-income females different incentives to return to work. I considered a subsample of 
women with below-median income (18,000 euros per year). Table 7 reports the reform effect 
on the marginal probability of employment for low-income mothers. There is no evidence of 
any significant policy effect on mothers’ participation decision during the first year of parental 
leave. The estimation results indicate that the employment prior to birth and the availabil-
ity of formal child care increase the probability of being employed during the first year of 
Table 6 Average marginal effects for maternal childcare decision
Leave year Participation Full-time Part-time




































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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motherhood. The estimates presented in Panel B of Table 7 indicate that the reform had no 
effect on the mothers’ employment for the second year. Only for full-time employment, the 
policy had some positive and significant effect at the 10% level.
Table 8 provides evidence that suggests different behavior patterns for high-income moth-
ers. They report strong reductions in both part-time and full-time employment during the first 
year of motherhood. This sizable negative effect becomes insignificant for the mothers who 
were employed prior to childbirth. This finding suggests that career-oriented mothers did not 
change their employment behavior after the reform. Interestingly, the factor of formal child-
care availability becomes insignificant for the employment decision. One possible explanation 
is that high-income mothers can afford the private childcare. For the second year of mother-
hood, the behavioral pattern changes: the probability to work increases significantly for the 
postreform mothers; the childcare availability increases the possibility of labor participation. 
The effect is driven by part-time employed mothers.
I checked whether the baseline estimation results are robust to the different income defi-
nitions, such as monthly gross and net wages of the mother before giving birth, her partner’s 
Table 7 Average marginal effects for maternal childcare decision: low-income category
Decision Participation Full-time Part-time
Employment decision Panel A: first year of motherhood
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Employment decision Panel B: second year of motherhood 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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monthly wage, and household income. I also used working hours instead of labor income. 
Controlling for the different categories, I found the same pattern in terms of policy effect on 
the probability of being employed: it remains insignificant.
I considered two age brackets: 20–30 and 30–40.31 The results are robust to the age 
specification; the findings still confirm the insignificant impact of the policy on the maternal 
employment probability.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the impact of the 2007 reform in the German parental leave system on 
maternal employment. The postreform universal system of benefits is more generous in terms 
of the amount of the benefit, but it pays for a shorter period of time. I estimated the short-
run effects of the policy focusing on the maternal employment during the first three years of 
the motherhood. The mothers are protected from the job dismissal during this period. The 
31 The sample size does not allow the lower intervals.
Table 8 Average marginal effects for maternal childcare decision: high-income category
Decision Participation Full-time Part-time
Employment decision Panel A: first year of motherhood
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Employment decision Panel B: second year of motherhood
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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 financial incentives to work are significantly different for the pre- and postreform groups. I 
compared mothers who were eligible for the new benefit after childbirth with ineligible moth-
ers. Assignment to treatment depends on the date of the child birth. All mothers who had a 
child on January 1, 2007, and afterward were entitled for the universal benefits. Based on data 
from GSOEP 2002–2014, I evaluated maternal employment responses in the first five years 
after the policy changed. Given the importance of childcare for a labor participation decision, I 
considered two specifications allowing for different channels of correlation. In the first model, 
I assumed that a mother takes decisions simultaneously and they are correlated through unob-
served characteristics. The second specification allowed the direct impact of childcare decision 
on the employment.
Without controlling for a mother’s selection of childcare, I found that the reform affects 
maternal labor outcomes in two directions. First, the higher parental leave allowance decreases 
the income losses of the mothers who were employed before giving birth. As a result, the prob-
ability of returning to work decreases during the first year of motherhood for high-income 
mothers. Second, the probability to work jumps significantly during the second year of moth-
erhood, once the benefits terminate. These findings are in line with previous research by Kluve 
and Tamm (2013), Bergemann and Riphahn (2011), and Geyer et al. (2015).
However, after conditioning on the mother’s particular childcare decision, the policy 
effects become insignificant. The result of the policy effect remains only for high-income moth-
ers. They are more likely to decrease their working hours during the first year of motherhood 
and return to work more rapidly during the second year of motherhood. I interpreted these 
findings as evidence of the successful reform implementation only for mothers from the upper 
tail of labor income distribution.
My evidence suggests that the employment status before birth and the possibility of child 
care have strong impact on the maternal employment. The mothers from the regions where 
the public slots are more accessible have higher probability to use them. Therefore, they have 
more flexibility in working hours. As a result, the probability to return to work increases sig-
nificantly.
Overall, there is no significant positive shift in probability associated with the intro-
duction of the reform. The only group demonstrating a positive response to the introduced 
changes is of high-income women who worked prior to the child’s birth. The results suggest 
that the implementation of the reform can produce ambiguous effects for the targeted group if 
the institutional constraints are not taken into account. Using structural estimation, Geyer et 
al. (2015) and Bick (2016) showed that the low availability of public child care and the absence 
of a private childcare market, together with low levels of informal arrangements, create a bar-
rier for a mother to participate in the labor market. Given constraints in childcare availability 
and relatively low losses of future income, mothers might prefer to postpone their return to 
employment. To sum up, the empirical evidence does not confirm the policy’s effectiveness in 
stimulating maternal employment once one controls for the childcare decision.
These findings highlight two important issues. First, the family policy is a set of inter-
related measures. The parental leave reform has been costly to the German society, and the 
average annual expenditures are approximately 0.17% of GDP (Kluve and Schmitz, 2018). The 
effectiveness of the reform has been constrained by the German childcare institutions. Second, 
the reform impact is context dependent. It is questionable that the reforming parental leave 
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on the same scheme would lead to the same results in other European countries. However, 
the conclusion that the childcare system is an important factor to be considered for modeling 
parental leave system is applicable beyond the German context.
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